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THE MEASURES

TO BE PURSUED IN

INDIA,

FOR

Ensuring the PERMANENCY, and augmenting the COMMERCE, of the COMPANY,

FARTHER CONSIDERED;

With the HEADS of a PLAN

For carrying those Measures into Execution.

By the Author of Observations on the Present State of the East India Company, &c.

LONDON,
Printed for J. NOURSE, Bookseller to His MAJESTY.
MDCCLXXII.

MEASURES

TO BE PURSUED IN

INDIA,

FOR

Ensuring the PERMANENCY, and augmenting the COMMERCE, of the COMPANY,

PARTLY CONSIDERED;

With the HEADS of a PLAN

For carrying their Measures into Execution.

By the Author of Observations on the Present State of the East India Company, &c.

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MDCCLXXIII.

CONTINUATION

OF THE

MEASURES to be purſued in INDIA.

I HAVE, in a former pamphlet, endeavoured to give the public ſome idea of the general ſyſtem of government in the Eaſt Indies, the wealth it abounds with, and the diſtracted ſtate of that part of the empire we are become maſters of. I have likewiſe pointed out the abſurdity of any attempt the Company may make, to preſide as ſovereigns over the civil, the military, the commercial, and the political, in ſhort the whole of their affairs in that part of the world, involved as they are in difficulties and intricacies by a long ſeries of miſtakes; and I have ſhewn the neceſſity of ſome immediate and eſſential alterations in their ſyſtem, to make their exiſtence worth preſerving much longer. I ſhall now ſubmit to the further opinion of my countrymen, ſome General Heads of a Plan, cal-

culated to produce order and good government in India, without which no great nor any lasting benefit can arise to this kingdom; premising first a few considerations, and stating and explaining certain local customs and general facts necessary to be previously known.

The great distance our possessions in the East Indies lay from home, the wretched mode of government which prevails throughout our dominions there, and the want of power in the Company to punish those servants who are guilty of misconduct, are the principal impediments which prevent this nation from acquiring those very great advantages that the rich and fertile countries of Bengal and the Carnatic might yield us.

Whether or no such a system can ever be formed, as shall, at so great a distance, produce any lasting benefit to this kingdom, time and experience only can determine. The prospect of success, however, would incline me to wish for the trial; even though the near approach of ruin to the Company, did not make it absolutely necessary. But at the present dangerous crisis, parliament, in my opinion, ought to enter seriously upon this great national concern, and to establish some wise regulations; for if the affairs remain longer in their

their preſent unſettled ſtate, the Company will in a very few years be irrevocably undone.

The ſame general ſyſtem of government prevails throughout the whole extent of the empire; whether under the Gentoo Rajahs, or the Subahdas of the Moors. The alterations the Moguls made in the government at different times, inſtead of amending this ſyſtem, have only made it worſe; for they have exerciſed every where ſuch rapacity, and extortion, as have greatly encreaſed the miſery of the inhabitants. The power of deſpotiſm is ever ſupported by cruelty and fear, the continual exerciſe of the firſt inflates the mind with brutal pride and inſolence, the other ſubjects it to the moſt abject ſlavery.

The occupiers of the lands among the Hindoos were originally fixed in the poſſeſſion of them, on principles of equity; they might have enjoyed affluence and amaſſed wealth, but the ſimplicity of the earlier ages did not lay ſufficient reſtraints upon the hand of power to ſecure them from future oppreſſion.

The Moors have left the occupier no more of his original right than the name; for though the right of tillage, and the power of alienating his land, remains with him; yet, being conſtantly ſtript of the

produce by farmers and collectors of the crown, he is in reality reduced to the ſtate of the labourer who works for his daily ſuſtenance.

Theſe farmers of the revenue have gradually encreaſed in their extortion, from very natural and obvious cauſes, which will unavoidably ariſe in arbitrary governments; hence the occupier having no more than a bare ſubſiſtence from his lands, has no inducement to till them with induſtry and ſpirit; and the right he poſſeſſes, is become a burthen, ſubjecting him to puniſhments, and oppreſſions; from which, as a labourer, he would be exempt.

The prince, by conferring on his Zemindars both the collective and judicial power, has in every province raiſed up a number of petty tyrants; who were to be held within bounds, by that power only, which could inſtantly deſtroy them.

This moſt powerful, and indeed the only effectual controul, Lord Clive unfortunately removed, when he took the Duannee for the Company; becauſe, by aboliſhing the authority of the Suba, and ſubſtituting no proper check in its place, he left the government of the country with greater imperfections than he found in it. His want of higher authority, ill health, and the confuſion which prevailed in the ſettlement, at

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the time his Lordſhip was laſt in India, might poſſibly prevent him from fixing the government under better regulations; for I am of opinion, no man was more equal to the taſk.

The kingdom of Bengal is the part of India we are at preſent moſt intereſted in, it is that from which our advantages chiefly derive, but from the confuſion it is thrown into, by our errors and miſconduct, is likely to involve the Company in ruin.

I ſhall, therefore, in order to propoſe a remedy, endeavour to point out the cauſes of the decline of the revenue in thoſe provinces; and of that general diſtreſs which is yearly encreaſing.

It is not the preſent intention to enter into a minute detail of the various officers belonging to the Indian government; I ſhall confine myſelf principally to the Zemindars, on whoſe conduct much of the welfare and proſperity of the country depends, and whoſe ill-regulated power is perhaps the principal cauſe of the deficiency of thoſe revenues, which are now become the property of the Company.

To underſtand this, it is neceſſary to know from what ſources the princes revenues ariſe; one of them is the proportion he claims of all the produce of the earth, and of whatever is nouriſhed by it. This

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he collects from all lands, those only excepted which are appropriated to the church, the poor, to jaghires, or any particular donation; another is, all the profits which arise from the administration of justice; and, unfortunately for the inhabitants of the country, very great profits arise from fines, and amerciaments, levied on delinquents in the Cutcherees, or courts of judicature. The prince also claims all confiscations, buried treasures, and mines, where-ever found; and these are reserved in the grants of lands, and are called the royalties. The prince likewise collects duties on every branch of inland trade, and on goods brought from different provinces of his own country, and also on the goods brought from foreign countries, those exports and imports exempted by the Company's Firmaund, only excepted. A ground-rent is collected on all lands appropriated for building houses, and for markets; and every thing vendible can only be sold at wholesale markets, or at the retail shops licensed for those purposes. New vessels and boats pay a tax; fees likewise arise from marriages, and on bonds, and for the priviledge of exercising trades, &c. in short, there is nothing exempted from some tax, or tribute: all these different branches fall under the management of Zemindars, who

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are both judicial and revenue officers; they conſiſt of various ranks; the ſmalleſt village, with its diſtrict, having a head or Zemindar, who is reſponſible to others above him; and all of them to the chief Zemindar of the province, who, in like manner, is anſwerable to the Duan, or treaſurer; and all of them ſeparately to the prince or ſtate.

Theſe Zemindars are paid by certain fees collected from the parties whoſe cauſes are brought into their Cutcherees, or courts, and which they determine in their judicial capacity; they likewiſe receive a per-centage on the rents they collect: almoſt all the different parts of the revenue are ſet by them to farm for the ſhare due to the ſtate; and the beſt lots are very frequently rented by the Zemindars, under whoſe direction they ought to be fairly put up to public ſale. This is effected by ſome of their dependants, who mix with the bidders, and being generally known, no one dare bid againſt them, by which means they are ſtruck down to them at a price inferior to their real value.

The Zemindars, and other officers *, plundering and oppreſſing without mercy,

* The large Zemindarees are generally obtained by preſents to the prince, or to his Duan, theſe preſents are conſiderable ſums of money, as far as two or three lacks of rupees.

often eſcape with impunity, by making preſents to thoſe above them; and thereby purchaſing indemnity for their crimes: but when theſe little tyrants have ſtript the miſerable occupier of the very means of ſubſiſtence, and thereby deficiencies ariſe in the revenue they are not able to make good; the prince then ruſhes in upon the guilty Zemindar, ſeizes his wealth, and ſentences him to be laſhed to death. No other check could poſſibly reſtrain the rapacity of the revenue officers, and others inveſted with power; but this, though it prevents the ruin of the ſtate, is not calculated to relieve the renters, or occupiers, from the wretchedneſs and miſery of their condition; becauſe it is ſeldom exerted until the evil has been carried to its utmoſt height: yet this neceſſary and eſſential controul lord Clive entirely removed.

The Duan, his farmers and collectors, acquainted with the mildneſs of our laws, and the difficulty that often attends bringing offenders to juſtice, and now releaſed from all dread of puniſhment from their prince, have, ever ſince the year 1766, plundered and diſtreſſed the country without mercy.

Thus much for the Zemindars; there are, beſides, ſome other cauſes, that contribute to injure our revenues, on which I ſhall briefly remark.

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The produce of the earth in every different province, when ſent out to another, becomes an article of trade; this produce diſpoſed of in a partial manner, to whomſoever the chief of our factory in ſuch province or diſtrict recommends, or permits through his influence to buy up, will certainly prevent it from fetching its proper value, and, of courſe, reduce the revenue. The duties on foreign and inland-trade, with the tolls and collections in and about great cities, and over rivers, form a conſiderable part of the revenue; the payment of which, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, can eaſily be evaded.

The European gentlemen, either in their own names, or in conjunction with their agents, and others under their protection, carry on a great part of the inland-trade all over the provinces, or at leaſt may center it wherever they think proper. Theſe gentlemen cannot, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, be under any controul from the Directors at home, nor from the Zemindars, or any officer of the ſtate abroad.

The merchants alſo, who contract for goods at the Aurongs, or manufacturing villages, are chiefly Europeans, or their dependents, and will naturally act in whatever manner appears to them moſt for their own intereſt; and, conſequently, will often

extend the privilege of the Company's Firmaund to unreaſonable lengths: here alſo the revenue is greatly injured. The officers preſiding at the Chokeys, or houſes of cuſtom, cannot poſſibly prevent theſe abuſes; for, awed by our power, they dare not examine nor ſtop the property of thoſe natives who paſs under an European protection: hence theſe officers of the revenue, encouraged by the cuſtom of the country, and the peculiar faſhion of the times, only attend to enriching themſelves, by oppreſſions on the weak and helpleſs, the only perſons on whom they dare exerciſe their authority; and this they find they can effect with greater impunity, now the power of the Subahdar is aboliſhed.

When we conſider the great checks on induſtry from monopolies, and reſtraints of various kinds, by which the proper merchant of the country is ſo fettered and embarraſſed, that he can no longer trade to any advantage; and that by theſe monopolies and reſtraints the neceſſaries of life become advanced in their price; and when we add to theſe the great ſcarcity of money, we muſt at once be convinced, that inevitable ruin will ſoon overtake the Company, if ſome ſpeedy remedy be not applied to ſtop the growing evil; an evil the more alarming, as the Company, with their preſent

ſent extenſive connections cannot be undone, without the hazard of much injury to the nation.

Individuals, in all the different departments, find too great an advantage from ſuch ſcenes of confuſion as have paſt of late years, not to wiſh the continuance; but in ſuch circumſtances the greater the encreaſe is of ſervants, and the higher their emoluments, the greater will likewiſe be the anarchy, the luxury, and the diſſipation which will ſpring up where men are under little or no controul; nor can any partial alterations or amendments made by the Company, either in their preſent ſtate, or by any farther power Parliament can conſiſtently delegate to them, anſwer the deſired ends.

I call on any gentleman to produce a ſingle inſtance of the leaſt benefit that has accrued ſince the year 1762, from any one new regulation or meaſure the Company have attempted to eſtabliſh; on the contrary, the ſtate of the country has ſince that time continually been declining, in ſpite of every endeavour that has been made to raiſe it. I ſhall therefore throw together what appears to me the likelieſt means to prevent thoſe evils in future, which have hitherto been ſo fatal to the public intereſt.

Every poſſible and immediate power of puniſhment, not incompatible with the ſecurity of property, muſt be inveſted ſomewhere; and the perſon, or perſons, ſo empowered, ſhould be amenable here at home to anſwer for their conduct, not only with their fortunes, but their lives alſo, whenever they ſhall be found guilty of outrageous violence or oppreſſion.

The full ſecurity of property, a free and open trade granted to all the natives, and that all the taxes and reſtraints deemed neceſſary, be laid with as equal and light a hand as poſſible, are the moſt eſſential regulations wanted. The inhabitants of Bengal, being once ſenſible of the effect ſuch regulations would produce, and perſuaded of their ſtability, a great encreaſe of wealth and population would ſoon follow; for numbers, from the diſtant provinces of the empire, would be tempted in a very few years to ſhelter themſelves under our protection. I am aware, that it may be ſaid, the natives are not capable of enjoying that degree of freedom our laws enſure to us; and that with them it would probably degenerate into licentiouſneſs: to this I anſwer, that I ſee no neceſſity of changing their government entirely; all I think requiſite, is, for them to live under ſuch a controul, as the wiſeſt and beſt of their

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own princes exerted over them; only, inſtead of its depending on the will or caprice of any individual, I would wiſh to ſee it ſecured by ſuch fixed laws, as the wiſdom of our legiſlative body ſhall determine. On no account muſt the ancient principles of the government be changed, it ſhould only have ſuch checks as may effectually prevent anarchy and oppreſſion. One great ſtep towards producing them will be to have the ſeveral departments of the ſtate properly ſeparated.

My plan is to eſtabliſh two great powers, whoſe public intereſts ſhall be the ſame, but their private intereſts oppoſite; ſo that one will conſequently take the alarm, whenever the other ſhall attempt to purſue its own private advantage at the expence of that of the public.

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THE GENERAL HEADS OF THE PLAN.

A VICEROY is to be eſtabliſhed over all the new territorial acquiſitions, with a general council conſiſting of fifteen or ſixteen members to aſſiſt him: the Viceroy ſhould be inveſted with every immediate power of puniſhment, and controul, that can be given with ſafety. I would farther propoſe, that the Company retain the ſeveral preſidencies, with thoſe ſubordinate factories, they now enjoy; and alſo the privilege of eſtabliſhing any ſuch new factories, as they ſhall find neceſſary for the benefit of trade; but that their juriſdiction be reduced within the ſame original boundaries round their forts and factories, as limited them at the time of the union of the two Companies, under the earl of Godolphin's mediation, at the beginning of this century; and that, to the extent of thoſe ſeveral limits, they hold the ſame judicial

judicial authority that has been granted to them by their charter, or by any other ſubſequent acts of parliament. That the Company have every aſſiſtance and ſupport alſo from the Viceroy, and the right of immediate appeal home, on the leaſt obſtruction to their trade by the ſervants of the crown, whether directly to their immediate injury; or indirectly, by oppreſſing the merchants of the country, or by giving too great encouragement to private European merchants, in conſequence of preſents, or other illicit connections with them, by which any part of the Company's commerce may receive detriment.

I would fix this ſupreme council ſomewhere in-land from Maſulapatnam, near the banks of the Kriſtna—The political and civil affairs of every kind, the care of the revenues, the tranquility of the country, the encouraging of manufactories and tillage, and every thing that concerned the general intereſt of the country, ſhould all be under the management and inſpection of the Viceroy and his council.

The Viceroy ſhould never leave this ſeat of reſidence, except on very extraordinary occaſions; he ſhould be inveſted with the whole executive power; but in ſettling new meaſures to be taken, and in regulations of every ſort, or briefly in whatever was to be debated by the council, he ſhould only

have the caſting voice: he ſhould have the power of making all military appointments, (the commander in chief excepted) and ſhould have ſuch general authority over the army as to order its marches, to ſend it forth, or call it back again; but in all other reſpects the commander in chief of the forces ſhould have the direction.

The army ſhould be in three grand diviſions, one on each coaſt, and one at Bengal. The Viceroy ſhould keep up the correſpondence with the Indian ſtates, which, at times, he ſhould lay before his council: he ſhould appoint all envoys; and two or more members of the great council ſhould reſide at or near the head-quarters of the great diviſions of the army; not to interfere in military regulations, but to act in all civil concerns of the army, to prevent it from running into exceſſes; and from plundering the natives; to watch over contractors, commiſſaries, and collectors; to iſſue orders for payments, to inſpect accounts, but never to pay. Thoſe members of the council ſent to Bengal, into the Carnatic, and to the coaſt of Malabar, ſhould be relieved every two or three years, and a conſtant rotation take place, thro' all the members, at every different place appointed for their reſidence. The diſtant members of the great council being thus ſhifted, it would become

become very difficult for them to perpetrate any thing eſſentially hurtful, either to the intereſt of the King, or Company.

The emoluments to the Viceroy and his council ſhould ariſe entirely out of the revenues, nor ſhould they have the privilege or power of trading or dealing in any ſhape whatever, but be ſubject on detection to ſevere penalties, beſides diſmiſſion; this would make the board always watchful over the abſent members, and both the members of the board, and thoſe abſent in the provinces, would all be very attentive to diſcover any oppreſſions or extortions on the occupiers; any monopolies in trade, or any methods taken to evade duties, cuſtoms, or collections of any ſort, becauſe they would ſenſibly affect the revenues of the crown. This circumſtance of receiving their ſalaries out of the revenues of the crown, would alſo induce them to give their attention and apply their endeavours to promote the freedom and equality of trade, as the likelieſt means of encreaſing the revenue; and at the ſame time, encreaſing both their fortunes, and their reputations.

The Viceroy ſhould not diſpoſe of the revenue, but in conjunction with his council. Nor ſhould he ever ſit as a magiſtrate, in any judicial capacity whatever.

He ſhould have the power of calling perſons to an account, and of immediate puniſhment, even to death; whenever generals, judges, or officers of great truſt, were found, on a fair and open trial, (which he ſhould bring them to) guilty of ſelling juſtice; or of any great oppreſſions, or crimes, in their departments.

It would be neceſſary to make the attainment of juſtice as ſpeedy, and the detection of oppreſſors, as clear from obſtruction as poſſible.

I would never have the ſupreme council ſit on judicial affairs, except as an high court of appeals; or as a court of juſtice, for the trial of great criminals, by commiſſion from the Viceroy: and whenever the council ſat in a judicial capacity, the preſident for that purpoſe ſhould be a perſon appointed from home, learned in the laws of theſe kingdoms, and alſo in the civil law.

The Nabobs, Rajahs, and Fouſdars, ſhould preſide over large provinces and extenſive diſtricts, with the ſame executive and collective powers they enjoy at preſent; but they ſhould exerciſe no judicial power whatever, and the extent of their executive power ſhould be carefully marked out, ſo as to prevent any improper exertions of that power. I would have judicial Zemindars continued to preſide over every village and its

diſtrict; but they ſhould have no authority in any other capacity. The farming and collecting of the revenues ſhould be intruſted to men not inveſted with any judicial power whatever; theſe inferior Zemindars ſhould be accountable to Cutcherees, or courts of larger diſtricts; whoſe Zemindars ſhould only have higher judicial authority; and one great court ſhould be eſtabliſhed in every province, or diſtrict of large extent, with European judges appointed to preſide over the whole, who muſt conform to the Indian modes of diſtributing juſtice as near as poſſible. Theſe European Zemindars or judges ſhould be alſo appointed from home; but all the Zemindars from amongſt the natives ſhould be made by the Viceroy. The ſupreme courts ſhould be viſited at times by members of the board; and the European judges ſhould, at ſtated times, be ſhifted to preſide over diſtant courts; in the ſame manner as is propoſed for the removal of the members of the great council.

The ſalaries of the Zemindars ſhould be fixed and ſettled. Thoſe of the European judges ſhould be very conſiderable; and every method ſhould be taken to make them independent, watchful, and impartial.

I would have fines levied on the inferior Zemindars, whenever the produce of the lands in their diſtricts fell off, or the occupiers were negligent; this would create an emulation amongſt them, each endeavouring that his diſtrict ſhould be in the moſt flouriſhing condition; and on a proper repreſentation of their merit, which the ſtate of the country would always determine, rewards ſhould be appointed for them; and every poſſible encouragement ſhewn, by removing them to higher courts.

The lands ſhould be let in large lots, not on leaſe to Zemindars, or farmers, but to immediate occupiers for life, or for a term of years; the government's ſhares ſhould be fixed, and ſettled, in the moſt public manner. This would make the occupiers advantage depend on his induſtry and the flouriſhing ſtate of his lands; and by theſe ſteps, he would have the proſpect of a full reward for his labour. I do believe, one of the moſt eſſential points is to ſecure the occupier of the land the ſpeedieſt means of redreſs, whenever the collector attempted to extort on him; therefore the judicial power muſt be made as free and as independent as poſſible, and muſt be blended with no other power; for joining the judicial and collective in the ſame perſon, has

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at all times been productive of much tyranny and oppreſſion.

The Viceroy's conſtant reſidence being fixed in-land from Maſulapatnam, he would have an immediate command over the army, laying in and about the Carnatic; and if the paſſes over the mountains forming the weſtern boundaries of it, were garriſoned by our troops, the Carnatic could then only be entered through the plains of Trechinopoly; or from the Decan: the Viceroy would reſide upon the northern boundary of it, on the ſouth-eaſt confines of the Suba's dominions, in a ſituation from whence he might eaſily enter the Decan, and ſeize on Bengulure; a ſtrong fortreſs, ſituated in a large plain, which, as I have been informed, can eaſily be overflowed for ſome diſtance round about it. It is placed very near the ſouthern boundary of the Decan, and on the confines of the Myſore country; this fortreſs has generally belonged to the Morattahs, but is now in the poſſeſſion of Hyder: it would be very uſeful to us on many accounts, not only as a check upon both Madah-Row and Hyder, but alſo for the command it would give us in the Peninſula, and the intercourſe we ſhould ſecure by it with the coaſt of Malabar, on which ſide one great diviſion of the army ought to lay,

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and their head-quarters ſhould be fixed ſomewhere near Surat.

Through the northern Circars and Orixa, the viceroy would have an eaſy communication with Bengal, where another great diviſion of the army would lay: the head-quarters of this diviſion ſhould be fixed in the heart of our poſſeſſions there, or near the northern confines; and as far always as they conveniently might be from any of the Company's ſettlements. Near theſe head-quarters, the members of the great council ſhould fix their reſidence. Their buſineſs ſhould be to have a very watchful eye over every tranſaction worthy note, within their reſpective limits.

Theſe, or ſome ſuch meaſures would, I firmly believe, draw down, in a few years, great wealth from the diſtant provinces; the natives, invited by the ſecurity of property, would be happy to ſettle under our protection.

I now proceed to that part of my plan which reſpects the Company. They ſhould retain power ſufficient to ſecure them from every oppreſſion, and every impediment with which the ſervants of the crown might attempt to diſtreſs them; therefore the commercial part of the ſyſtem muſt be ſecured to the Company, ſubject to no controul, except what ſhall be found neceſſary, either

either on appeals from the deciſions of the Company's courts, lodged by the natives living without their limits; or by the Company's ſervants, on diſputes with the natives, or Europeans, not reſiding within their juriſdiction; and no other appeal ſhould lay from their own tribunals, but home to the King and council, in all affairs of property within their own limits.

I would have a right of immediate appeal home to lay with the governor and council of each preſidency, whenever the Company's affairs received the leaſt impediment or obſtruction in any thing relative to their trade, in any parts of the country without their particular limits.

The Company being fixed to their original plan, and their poſſeſſions and right of juriſdiction confined to the original bounds, they would have the ſame expence abroad, the ſame force to keep up, and the ſame revenue to ſupport them, as they had before their views extended, in the leaſt degree, to any thing beyond their trade.

They would carry on their commerce greatly increaſed, and they would tranſact their buſineſs with the natives freed from thoſe difficulties the princes of the country have often laid in their way, and under the immediate protection and aſſiſtance of their own ſovereign.

All

All the government remittances from India ſhould paſs through the hands of the Company, and be paid into the treaſuries of their reſpective ſettlements, ſeven or eight months before the goods are brought from the manufactories to the magazines of thoſe different ſettlements. This would enable the Company to contract for their goods on the beſt terms, by advancing the money before-hand at the Aurongs.

The remittances to government by paſſing through the Company thus, would be a conſiderable check upon the ſervants of the crown againſt any miſmanagement of the revenue; for any deficiency there would ſo ſenſibly affect the intereſt of the Company, that it could not long be hid from their ſervants; and as ſuch ſteps would hurt their private intereſt alſo, and draw down ruin on the Company, they would be very careful to lay open the true cauſe as ſoon as poſſible; and as government muſt equally ſuffer, puniſhment would be ſure to overtake the delinquent.

I would have all the cloathing for the troops, all the arms and ammunition, all the ſtores of various kinds for the navy, delivered by the Company's agent to the Viceroy's order, to be paid for by him at a price ſettled at home; ſo that the articles for the

crown

crown would be purchaſed and carried out by the Company, and they would be repaid abroad. The ſhips for the ſquadron in India ſhould be built there by the Company's agents, the King's great council contracting for them as the Viceroy ſhall ſee neceſſary. Theſe would be the likelieſt ſteps to ſave the Company's ſervants from oppreſſions; and the King's council would by their controuling power prevent the ſervants of the Company from monopolizing or otherways affecting the trade of the natives in any improper manner; at the ſame time, the whole and ſole right of trade being fixed to the Company as at preſent, their ſervants would be at liberty to purſue their employer's intereſt and their own, by increaſing and extending the commerce throughout India.

Such meaſures would ſoon lead to colonization, which would be very uſeful on many accounts. I will be bold to aſſert, if the preſent revenues were kept in a proper flouriſhing ſtate, the King might have a very ample reward for his great executive ſervants, not leſs than three hundred thouſand pounds a year to divide amongſt them, which the ſtate could very well afford. I am ſure the beſt incentive to induſtry, the ſecureſt means of promoting juſtice and integrity, is to be careful that the rewards of long ſervices and great truſts do not depend

on any uncertain accidents. I would therefore have their emoluments riſe and fall with the public concern alone.

To carry ſo great a work into execution, will require men of conſiderable abilities; for much will depend on the firſt Viceroy and his council. Wiſe men ſooneſt diſcover their own intereſt, and by thus blending it with that of the public, the ſervants of the crown would be prevented from neglecting their duty.

We want nothing farther at Bengal than what already belongs to us; for Orixa, the only part we are not actually poſſeſſed of, though it is our undoubted right, and a very ſmall force would reſtore it to us, is ſtill in the hands of the Morattahs.

On the weſt ſide of the peninſula, we have ſcarcely any footing. I have, in another place, endeavoured to ſhew, that a conſiderable territory might be obtained on that coaſt at a ſmall expence, and more eaſily preſerved than our poſſeſſions in Bengal.

I have there alſo ſhewn the general ſtate of the Conkon, or Low Country, which is better defended inland than any of the poſſeſſions we have at preſent; and alſo the juſt claim we have to the lands about Surat. The Bednure and Sounda provinces do not yield leſs than thirteen or fourteen hundred

thouſand pounds a-year revenue, a conſiderable part of which the Rajahs would gladly yield up to us, to be reſtored to their dominions, and relieved from all future dread of their oppreſſive tyrant Hyder: they would, beſides, put us in poſſeſſion of Mangalore and Carwar; and in ſuch caſe, the whole produce of the country could only be exported by us, or by our permiſſion.

The ſouthern provinces would receive great benefit from a maſter who ſhould by due encouragement teach them induſtry, and only ſecure to them half the price for the produce of their lands they are capable of yielding; for at preſent, the produce paſſing ſucceſſively through the hands of two or three purchaſers, before the real exporters can get them, the great advantage their trade affords centers with contractors.

The revenues along the Malabar coaſt inland only, up to the Gotts, more than equal the revenues we poſſeſs in Bengal.

The Shaw, or King, who ought to fill the throne at Delhi, is, from the diſtracted ſtate of the empire, greatly diminiſhed in his authority, and reduced in his revenues, and thinks himſelf happy to live under our protection: he wiſhes to remain free from dependence on his ſubjects, and would willingly inveſt us with any grants we deſired, to ſecure to himſelf, in return, the protection

we afford him, and the tributes he is too weak to obtain; and though his authority is much ſlighted through the empire, yet that authority, accompanying ſuch force as we can command, would give a ſanction to our arms, which would contribute to quiet thoſe minds conqueſt compelled to ſubmit to us.

Theſe acquiſitions would not only encreaſe the crown revenue, but alſo give the Company the command of all the cotton and cotton manufactures on the northern part of the Malabar coaſt, up as high as Amadabad, and of the whole produce of pepper and cardomoms to the ſouthward.

I ſhall now proceed to view the ſtate of the revenues when Lord Clive firſt took poſſeſſion of the country we now hold, and the ſtate alſo, that our commerce ſtands in at this preſent time; that the ſituation of affairs, both at home and abroad, may be thoroughly underſtood, in caſe government chuſes to interfere. The country is far from being cultivated to the height that it will bear; and many parts of the provinces, now over-run with woods and uninhabited, would admit of clearing and cultivating to advantage: hence great improvements would ariſe under a mild and wiſe government. In the preſent ſtate of the Subahſhip of Bengal (if we ſuppoſe the country not only free from

war,

war, but alſo from all thoſe devaſtations factions, cabals, and the want of ſubordination occaſion) the revenue will leave a clear annual gain in the treaſury, after all the expences of government are diſcharged, of one million five hundred thouſand pounds. I have fixed it at the ſtandard we found eſtabliſhed when we firſt took poſſeſſion of the revenues; for the preſent deficiencies ariſe from temporary cauſes, not from any incapacity in the country; therefore, when once the ſtate was ſettled, the crown revenues would return to their former amount, if not exceed it: and was a wiſe ſyſtem of government purſued, was property ſecured, and all thoſe blood-ſuckers, the ſupport of a tyrant's power, removed, the landholder would receive the full reward of his labour, and our King, without taking a rupee from the above ſum, be able to ſecure very great ſalaries for his ſervants, which would encreaſe in proportion with the revenue.

On the Coromandel coaſt, the revenues from the Circars yield upwards of * three hundred thouſand pounds; and our own poſſeſſions in the Carnatic bring in about three hundred thouſand pounds a-year more;

* They are capable of great improvement; but now let for about three hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds a-year.

but

but as the prince of that country depends entirely on our protection, inſtead of ſetting off different expences to his account, it would be more for our intereſt and advantage to have a large extent of the country under our own management.

When we conſider how often of late years the Carnatic has been the ſeat of war and deſolation, the heavy expences Mahommad Ally has all along been at, the high intereſt he has paid for money, and the vaſt arrears he has diſcharged to the Company at different times; theſe circumſtances muſt convince us, the reſources that country enjoys within itſelf exceed thoſe of all others we have any knowledge of:—its fertility, its manufactures, and its ſituation for defence, all concur to make it worthy the attention of the legiſlator.

The revenues of the Coaſt and of Bengal, as they ſtand at preſent, leave a ſurplus, after all annual expences are diſcharged, of near two millions, in the reſpective treaſuries. This ſum, therefore, will remain; to anſwer any increaſe in the military expences, to remit to Europe in goods, or for whatever exigences the country may require; but muſt, on no account, be ſent abroad in ſpecie.

It might be ſent in bills to the other ſide of India, but no other way; ſo that the Mala-

Malabar coaſt muſt provide for itſelf, which it is very capable of doing.

A bank, fixed upon the faith of public credit, would be of great advantage to the country, and the ſpeedieſt means of removing thoſe general inconveniencies and diſtreſſes to commerce and the ſtate, occaſioned by the want of ſpecie. A ſum not leſs than one million and a half ſterling, in the real currency of that country, has been ſent out of it, without the leaſt proſpect of its ever returning again: this is excluſive of the ſum Coſſim carried off, which equally promoted the diſtreſs; for being conveyed by him into diſtant parts of the empire, parts that have no intercourſe of trade with our poſſeſſions, contributed as much as the money ſent to China, to ſtagnate the circulation of ſpecie through the provinces of Bengal and thoſe of the Coaſt. Great part of what is ſent in tribute to the King tends to encreaſe the ſcarcity of ſpecie, as much of it is never returned.

Surely thoſe who have the conduct of Indian affairs, are not ſenſible of the bad effect ariſing from this ſcarcity of money, or they would not go on ſuffering it to be ſent out, though in ever ſo ſmall a degree. In ſhort, it is the primary cauſe of much of the preſent diſtreſs in that country; it does inconceivable injury to every branch of the

the commerce, and, joined to other miſtakes and irregularities, helps to occaſion the deficiency of the revenue. Not only a ſtop ſhould be put to the exporting ſilver or gold out of the country, but every meaſure taken to encourage foreigners to bring ſilver into it, and to induce the natives, by ſecurity and encouragement, to bring forth all that lies hoarded up. It is impoſſible to carry on trade without a ſubſtitute equivalent to the goods; for no man will part with his labour, or the produce of his land, without receiving ſome ſign, in return, equal to its value: and, as in arbitrary ſtates no paper credit can be eſtabliſhed on the faith of government, therefore money is the only ſign by which the trader and manufacturer can be rewarded; and of courſe, the more the trade and manufactures of the country encreaſe, the greater will be the demand for the ſigns by which it is carried on; from whence it is evident, that diminiſhing the quantity of ſpecie, either by hiding it or ſending it to other countries, will impede the circulation of trade, making it at times ſtand ſtill; and though, at firſt, it will only leſſen the goodneſs of the manufactures, yet, as the evil increaſes, which it will do if not timely prevented, the ſupply of the neceſſaries of life will fall off, and thereby be more enhanced. This will lead to depopulation, and depopu-

lation

lation will, as certainly, occaſion the decreaſe of manufactures, and of the revenue; and thus, by a conſtant decline, we ſhall very ſoon find ourſelves ſeated at a great annual expence in Bengal, deprived of the means of ſupporting it: whereas, it is from the encreaſe of the different manufactures, and the reduction of their prices, the advantages to this kingdom muſt principally be derived.

I foreſee no expence for government to apprehend beyond what the Company are now at, the ſquadron excepted.

I reckon ſeven or eight ſhips of the line, with ſome frigates, ought always to be kept up, and in a condition for ſea, in the ſame manner that his majeſty's ſhips are kept in the harbours here at home; for when we were engaged with no European powers, one or two of the line, with three or four frigates, would be ſufficient to keep in commiſſion.

A ſquadron muſt at firſt be ſent out; but in a very few years the ſhips might be conſtructed and ſupplied in India: for thoſe of a ſufficient burthen can be built at Bombay, Surat, and other places on that coaſt. To this end, a few principal builders will be required from home; but all the different artificers are to be found amongſt the natives: near the coaſt, there is great

plenty of ſhip-timber; and all the other articles required in the building and fitting a ſhip of war might be ſupplied from England.

All the naval expence might be eaſily ſupported from revenues on the Malabar coaſt, if we choſe it. A very material point to be conſidered is the ſupply of troops and ſeamen: this has hitherto been attended with difficulty to the Company and inconvenience to the nation, being a drain theſe kingdoms cannot well afford, eſpecially in time of war: there is likewiſe great danger in depending on ſupplies of men from ſuch a diſtance as Europe.

All the officers for the land and ſea ſervices muſt be ſent from hence; and, at firſt, many both of ſailors and of ſoldiers. Swiſs and Germans might be enliſted amongſt our own troops; and if the ſailors and ſoldiers were encouraged to marry, and proper methods were taken to promote coloniza-tion, they would become the means of ſupplies in future.

The Portugueſe preſerved their conſequence and power for a length of time, by colonization; and the remains of them are ſpread over India: they are mixed with the natives in many places, and are now a conſiderable part of the inhabitants of every European ſettlement.

Malays,

Malays, procured young, might be trained into either ſervice: they are a ſtout race of people, and do not want for ſpirit; by their means the Dutch have effected all their conqueſts, and they employ them, to this, day, in both land and ſea ſervice. I have no doubt but a ſufficient number of men might be found, without the neceſſity of diſtreſſing Great Britain by continual drains.

Such a force as I have here propoſed, would not only ſecure us from all invaſions the natives might attempt, it would alſo enable the government to act againſt any European powers who ſhould attack us; and whilſt other nations were warring againſt us in India, at an heavy expence to their mother-country, we ſhould be defending ourſelves againſt them, at the expence of foreign nations. The government may, on ſome ſuch plan as here laid down, without the hazard of much charge to the nation, take the management of the territorial acquiſitions to itſelf; the commerce ſtill remaining under the Company's direction, ſecured to them by parliament in the fulleſt manner, and free from any danger of reſtraint from the ſervants of the crown.

It appears to me impoſſible for the Company, either with their preſent power, or what can be further given to them, conſiſtent with this conſtitution, to keep up

that ſubordination neceſſary to preſerve them. Beſides, the Company will receive much more advantage from the trade alone, than they do at this time from the revenue and the trade together; and I am firmly of opinion, the nation will receive more real benefit than there is any idea of at preſent.

The government, holding the revenues, will have to pay for all the civil and military charges, the expence of building ſhips of war, and all the different ſtores brought from Europe; and the Company carrying out all the articles for the navy, and all the cloathing and ammunition for the army, will be repaid in India by the crown, at a price equivalent to the riſk and expence: in ſhort, every expence on the ſide of government for whatever was ſent from England, being paid for in like manner to the Company, whatever the crown received from India would, in this caſe, be a clear gain; and the additional articles ſent from this country will ſo far as their value extends, become of equal advantage to it, with the exports to America, or elſewhere.

The money government had to ſpare from their various expences abroad, being lent to the Company on bills of exchange (payable in England, on the ſale of the cargoes) and by them inveſted in the manufactures and growths of the countries wherein it was collected,

lected, and the money that government paid them for the different ſtores brought from England being alſo inveſted in the ſame manner, none of the ſpecie could be carried out of the country, but would circulate again among the natives, to greater advantage than ever it did from the treaſuries of their Subahs. The Company will trade upon this principle with ſuch ſuperior advantage, as will enable them to under-ſell all other nations; for in this caſe, a conſiderable part of the cargoes would not be paid for by the Company until they were ſold in England, and they would alſo receive a proper allowance on their riſk and expence for the ſtores carried out, for the uſe of the government.

The Company's returning cargoes from Bengal amount to near ninety lacks, or about one million ſterling or upwards; thoſe from Madraſs, before the laſt Carnatic war, amounted to two hundred thouſand pounds; this is the moſt beneficial branch of all, a great part conſiſting of goods that are afterwards manufactured in England.

The inveſtments from the Malabar coaſt conſiſt of coarſe piece-goods, cardamoms, pepper, and ſome few other articles; every other year a cargoe of coffee comes home from Mocha; of late years, all theſe together have ſeldom exceeded two hundred thouſand

thouſand pounds; this makes the inveſtments from the bay and the two coaſts amount altogether to one million four hundred thouſand pounds, or thereabouts.

If the plan I have laid down for the Malabar coaſt is ever carried into execution, the annual inveſtments from that ſide would equal five hundred thouſand pounds; and if the Carnatic remains at reſt, the inveſtments from thence will ſoon amount to three hundred thouſand pounds. This would make the whole from the three ſettlements one million eight hundred thouſand pounds; and is an encreaſe on the preſent annual amount of four hundred thouſand pounds. The Company's annual exports to India from hence, coſt them about three hundred thouſand pounds, and generally produce there three hundred and eighty thouſand pounds.

Let the additional articles to be carried yearly for the crown be ſet at three hundred thouſand pounds, theſe paid for on their arrival in India at thirty *per cent.* upon their coſt would produce the Company an annual ſum in India of about ſeven hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds, which would be ready for the purchaſe of the home inveſtments. The preſent inveſtments amount to about one million four hundred thouſand pounds, there then remains for the govern-

ment

ment to lend the Company not leſs than ſeven hundred thouſand pounds; and with the propoſed encreaſe, which may eaſily be obtained, the government's annual remittance from the three ſettlements would amount to one million one hundred thouſand pounds. On the above ſeven hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds produced from goods and ſtores, one hundred and fifty thouſand pounds is profit, ſo that the Company would only riſk about five hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds from home every year, for the returns of one million eight hundred thouſand pounds, at the firſt coſt abroad.—Let us ſuppoſe the Company, after paying the freight and other charges of the ſhips, the duties, ware-houſe-room, &c. to receive only a neat profit of twenty-five *per cent.* which would be much below what other nations could afford to ſell at; this, joined to the one hundred and fifty thouſand pounds gained outwards, would produce the Company a profit of ſix hundred thouſand pounds yearly, on a riſk of only five hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds of their own capital.

The inveſtments brought annually from China amount on an average, when raw ſilk is procureable, to upwards of ſix hundred thouſand pounds prime coſt—we will take them at ſix hundred thouſand pounds.

The inveſtment ſent annually to China in cloth and lead doth not amount to two hundred thouſand pounds, the Company loſe on the firſt article, but gain on the other. The goods ſent to China from different parts of India, together with the ſums belonging to private gentlemen paid into the Company's treaſury there, may be ſet, one year with another, at about one hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds; ſo that a ſupply of about two hundred and forty thouſand pounds in ſilver muſt be ſent from home (if no other method can be found) to complete the annual China inveſtment. On the above three hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds, I ſuppoſe about one hundred and twenty thouſand pounds may be ſet off to profits on the goods carried to China, and the remittances of private property through the treaſury of that factory: this brings the coſt of the goods carried to China to about two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds; therefore, the China trade will demand from Europe yearly four hundred thouſand pounds or upwards, in goods and money: I imagine great part of the ſilver, if not all, might hereafter be ſupplied by a channel that would conſiderably encreaſe the government remittances.—The China cargoes have fallen conſiderably of late years in their value, but

at

at this time they produce about fifty *per cent.* profit, after paying the freight, commiſſions to ſupra-cargoes, duties, and all other expences. This profit ariſing from the ſale of the China cargoes, joined to that gained on the goods carried to China, together with the profits on the Bencoolen pepper brought to Europe, makes this branch of the trade produce a yearly profit of about four hundred thouſand pounds: hence on a riſk every year to India and China of about nine hundred and ſeventy thouſand pounds, a gain will be produced of near one million on the ballance; for which not one third of the capital is hazarded.

The Company's capital amounts to three million two hundred thouſand pounds; the dividend at ten *per cent.* is three hundred and twenty thouſand pounds; and the intereſt on bonds and annuities, ſetting them at ſix millions at three *per cent.* amounts to one hundred and eighty thouſand pounds; theſe together make the ſum of five hundred thouſand pounds to pay in intereſt *; and leave a yearly ſurplus of near five hundred thouſand pounds more, for different ac-

* Government pays one hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds to the Company annually, for the intereſt on the loans advanced at their eſtabliſhment.

cidents, to defray extraordinary expences, to reduce their debts, and then to farther enriching themſelves.

Theſe benefits to the nation in general, and the Company in particular, cannot fail, if ſome wiſe plan is properly followed. The Company will enjoy much more ſecurity, and advantage, from the commercial part alone, than they do from their preſent ſplendid ſituation.

The Malabar coaſt is in a wretched ſtate, depending wholly on Bengal for ſupport; Bencoolen is at this time rather a loſing ſettlement; and St. Helena is a dead rent-charge of about eighteen thouſand pounds a year.

If every expence of government was paid out of the revenues abroad, (the principle ſet out upon) no charge, ſo long as thoſe revenues remained to the nation, could ariſe here at home. The remittances, joined to the preſent duties would bring into the king's treaſury here in England a yearly income of near two millions and an half; and there would be an encreaſe in the exports from England, of near three hundred thouſand pounds, and moſt of them articles manufactured in the kingdom; and this to ſupport an army, and a naval force, which, without a ſhilling expence to the nation, would defend us againſt

againſt the attacks of any European powers whatever.

I have propoſed, in this plan, an encreaſe of four hundred thouſand pounds in the inveſtment from India; this encreaſe is founded on ſpeculation, and is of courſe ſubject to contradiction; for it is on this ſurmiſe, the remittances home to government amounting yearly to one million, depends. Suppoſe the crown took the revenues as they ſtand at preſent, the advantage to the Company would be the ſame as on the propoſed plan; the difference would only be to the crown, in the means of remittance, and the ſecurity of the poſſeſſions; for government at the preſent amount of the inveſtment will be able to remit home ſix hundred thouſand pounds a year; and if the equipment of the fleet in India was laid aſide, the three hundred thouſand pounds allotted to be ſent out for that purpoſe in ſtores, together with its premium, would be lent out of the revenues of the crown in India, to the agents of the Company, for bills of exchange payable at home, and thereby encreaſe the crown's remittance, on the preſent annual inveſtment, to the amount of one million; the ſame as on the propoſed plan.

The ſurplus revenue, after all the annual demands are paid at Bengal, is now one

million and an half. I hope it will be allowed, that the ſervants of the crown could act with equal ſpirit, vigilance, and oeconomy, with the ſervants of the Company.

There would be a fair proſpect of ſupplying China with ſilver from Manilla. A ſhip comes there annually from New Spain, and brings chiefly ſilver, to purchaſe a cargoe conſiſting of the manufactures of India; great part of them the piece-goods made at Bengal, and along the coaſt of Coromandel.

Private merchants reſiding at Madraſs have had concerns in this trade, with the Moors, and Armenians, who principally carry it on—and I have not a doubt, but a great part of the ſilver, for the China market, to the amount of one hundred and fifty thouſand pounds, or two hundred thouſand pounds, might be ſupplied in exchange for callicoes, and other goods, the produce of Madraſs and Bengal; and government be enabled thereby to encreaſe their remittances home by all that ſum.

Beſides the uſual courſe in which this trade is carried on at preſent, many other channels of advantageous appearance offer themſelves to our view, Arabia and Perſia call for very large inveſtments in the ſilk and cotton manufactories; in return for which,

which, gold and ſilver, with ſome pearls, are brought back from the gulphs of Mocha, and Baſſora. This branch of the commerce is alſo chiefly in the hands of the Armenians and Moors.

On the eaſt ſide of the Bay of Bengal, only frequented by us for timber, many valuable improvements may be made: the Philipine iſlands, many of them are quite unfrequented and unknown to commerce. In ſhort, ſuch an influence, as this kingdom may acquire in India, would enable us to ſtrike out many uſeful branches of commerce, not thought of at preſent; there is nothing induſtry can effect, that may not be obtained, under ſuch advantages as theſe new regulations would produce. I may have erred in ſome ſmall degree in the commercial calculations: my information has not been quite ſo full as I could have wiſhed; yet ſufficient to ſupport my aſſertions, on a General Plan.

It is not the preſent intention to expatiate farther on this ſcheme, or to enter more minutely into it—but whenever ſome ſuch plan ſhall be carried into execution, and the whole properly ſettled; the gains, I am clear, both to government and to the Company, will exceed rather than fall ſhort of the profits in this general eſtimate allotted.——

Amongſt

Amongſt the arguments that have been uſed with intention to deter government from meddling with the conqueſts, the great expence which generally has ariſen from the wars with the Indians, has been held out to view and largely expatiated on; but this great expence, and eſpecially that of the laſt Carnatic war, was entirely owing to errors in judgment: we ſuffer for not having properly purſued our former ſucceſſes, for coming too ſoon to terms with our enemies, and for permitting them to cajole and over-reach us in their negotiations, or rather for permitting them to negotiate at all.

I have proceeded thus far in my Plan, without the vanity of ſuppoſing it faultleſs: I do not think myſelf equal to the taſk of perfecting any plan, I only mean to induce ſome more able head to attend to this important buſineſs, wiſhing that ſuch meaſures may be adopted and purſued as ſhall end all our diſſenſions, and eſtabliſh that tranquility ſo eſſential to the public good, and the proſperity of our affairs in that diſtant part of the world.

FINIS.